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The past twenty years have seen a revolution and rejuvenation of the Latin American 
banking sector. The relatively recent deregulation of the banking industry across Latin 
America has sparked a marked increase in the rate of bank privatizations and foreign 
banks’ investment throughout the region. Additionally, there has been increased 
competition among the surviving banks in an increasingly consolidated banking market. 
These occurrences are in addition to the numerous financial crises that were felt across 
Latin America and around the world over the past 20 years. All of these factors have 
helped in developing a unique and exciting framework of banking structures and 
dynamics throughout Latin America, with a noted effect on the level of banking cost 
efficiencies. 
With this paper we hope to present an overview of the literature in a number of areas 
that influenced and helped morph the Latin American banking sector over the past two 
decades. Also, the paper will look at economic models used to measure market 
concentration in order to test for monopolies as well as monopolistic and perfect 
competition among the banking industries of Latin America, and what the possible 
effects on the banking industry might be. This then leads into a discussion on 
efficiencies and if the level of market concentration and competition has an effect on 
overall banking efficiency. Additionally, this paper will focus a large proportion of its 
discussion on the special case of Brazil’s domestic banking industry and the effects on 
its levels of efficiency when taking into account competition and market concentration.  
The paper is structured into a diverse array of topics that are needed to achieve an 
understanding of the current situation in Brazil’s banking sector, as well as the 
economic theories that we hope to use in order to explain a relationship between market 
concentration, competition, historical factors, and banking efficiency in Brazil. The first 
section is used to explore the recent trends and occurrences in the Latin American 
banking sector in order to give an overall idea of the trends in the region. The second 
section looks at Brazil specifically and the effects that the Real Plan and subsequent 
government interventions had on the overall Brazilian banking industry. The third 
section looks at the influence of foreign banking institutions on the domestic banking 
industry of Brazil and other nations, and how these influences have helped form a more 
liquid and stable banking environment. The fourth section switches to looking at 
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different possible economic models and theories that researchers can use in order to test 
market concentration, levels of competition, and levels of efficiency, for example the 
Panzer-Rosse H-Stat (Panzer and Rosse 1987) as well as Demsetz (1973) efficient 
structure hypothesis. The fifth section looks more closely at monopolistic competition 
and the theory of the quiet life scenario for monopolies for highly concentrated 
industries, and the counter quiet life sentiments and ideals put forth by Demsetz (1973). 
The sixth section concludes the research part with a reflection on the most important 
topics discovered during the review and is then followed by a separate section 
containing ideas for future research that we intend to develop.  
 
2. Recent Trends in the Latin American Banking Sector 
The past two decades have seen a rash of changes throughout the Latin American 
banking industry. The changes have come in the forms of deregulation of state run 
banks, bank privatizations, restructuring of banking laws and systems, the opening of 
domestic banking markets to more foreign competition, and many other phenomenon.  
The 1980’s are termed by some economists as a “lost decade” for Latin America (Fraga 
2004). This term comes about in perspective to the rapid growth seen throughout Latin 
America in the 1970’s and to some extent in the rebound in Latin American economies 
through a great part of the 1990’s. The World Bank’s data on Per Capita Growth for the 
decades in discussion show a severe downturn in not only particular countries, but for 
the whole Latin American region in general. For example, Brazil’s Per Capita Growth 
for the 1970’s was a robust 5.9% on average for each year of the decade. This was then 
followed by a stalled economy for the entire 1980’s with an average Per Capita Growth 
of -0.4%, literally a lost decade of nothing to show for it in terms of growth. This was 
then followed by a modest 1990’s average Per Capita Growth of 1.3%. Latin America 
in general in a weighted average of economies of Growth Per Capita was, 3.8 for the 
1970’s, -0.6 for the 1980’s, and a return to growth of 1.7% throughout the 1990’s. This 
is in comparison to the United States Per Capita over the period (for a perspective) of 




Average Per Capita GDP Growth for the Period 1970-1999 on a Per Decade Basis 
(Fraga 2004) 
 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 
Brazil 5.9% -0.4% 1.3% 
Latin America 3.8% -0.6% 1.7% 
United States 1.7% 2.2% 2.0% 
This data shows that in general the entire Latin American market was in a financially 
lost decade that many felt needed to be dealt with (Tornell et al 2003, Fraga 2004). 
Other indicators that showed some of the deepening need for reform throughout the 
region can be seen in the inflation rates. Argentina averaged a rate of over 437% for the 
1980’s while Brazil felt the sting of a 336% inflation rate through the 1980’s. Overall 
the Latin American region had a weighted average inflation rate of approximately 
223%, while the comparative U.S. consumer only felt a 4.7% increase in inflation 
(Fraga 2004).  
These combined effects of negative growth and breakneck inflation affected all areas of 
the economies and this would include the banking sector. Governments knew that 
something needed to be done, and reform was the name of the game. Therefore there 
was the so called “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990, Fraga 2004) which 
recommended different types of reform on a country by country basis. However the 
general ideas put forth were: monetary and fiscal control on the part of the domestic 
governments, a more open foreign trade policy, sets of privatizations in certain 
government controlled companies and industries, as well as deregulation in other areas 
of the economy, including the banking sector (Williamson 1990, Fraga 2004).  
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) discuss the effects of reforms taken by many of the 
governments of the region during the last twenty years. Their findings narrow down the 
two main areas where the governmental reforms of their particular banking sectors have 
occurred. The first deals with the structure of the banking systems in terms of their legal 
makeup, authority, and powers. The second area of reforms was in the banking 
regulatory area where governmental agencies were restructured in order to assure more 
sound banking practices and regulation.  
The reasons for these reforms are numerous, not of least of which were the financial 
crises that struck continually throughout the region over the past twenty years, some 
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examples (Lindgren et al., 1997, Beck 2005, Hunter 2006, Holland et al 2006, Yildirim 
and Philippatos 2007). As well as the Per Capita Growth stagnation and inflation 
throughout the preceding decade of the 1980’s (Fraga 2004). According to Lindgren et 
al. (1997) the IMF reported that nearly nine out of ten Latin American countries faced 
serious financial or banking crisis during the period. Additionally there were crises 
outside of the region that affected the financial sector: Asian countries in 1997 and 
Russia in 1998 (De Paula and Alves 2003).  
The ubiquitous nature of these crises shows an overall need of reform throughout the 
region. Many governments felt that a change was needed and that inefficient and 
underperforming banks needed to be taken from the market (Nakane and Weintraub 
2005). The first round of much needed financial system reforms came about in the early 
nineties. The first group of countries Mexico, El Salvador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile 
(an exception since their major banking reform legislation was in 1986), Brazil, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru started overhauling their banking system with 
significant changes in their banking laws and regulations (Yildirim and Philippatos, 
2007). There were countries which did reform their banking systems, however not to the 
extent of the first group. These would include countries such as Columbia and Costa 
Rica. Then there were countries that only slightly altered their banking regulations 
include Argentina, Guatemala, and Uruguay (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). 
However, just because countries did follow through with structural changes it did not 
necessarily halt their financial problems, as can be seen in the cases of Mexico in 1994, 
Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2002 (Hallwood et al 2006, Hunter 2006).  
Another factor leading to needed reforms is the increasing level of integration of Latin 
America into the global market. Globalization and new competition has put a strain on 
Latin American domestic banks in order for them to keep up with the vast new financial 
products that international institutions were offering. The free flow of trade and capital 
that follow along with globalization were a driving force in needed reforms in the 
domestic banking sector in order for the domestic banks to compete on a global scale 
against their foreign counterparts (Aguirre and Norton 2000). Further changes such as 
technological advancements improved banking regulation and competition at the 
international level and have also been seen as a driving force in reform in the Latin 
American banking sector (Yildrim and Philippatos 2007). 
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These numerous crises, pressures from globalization, and governmental reforms 
targeted at weeding out inefficient banks have led to a consolidation in the overall 
domestic banking sectors of Latin America. According to Yeyati and Micco (2003) 
there has been a decrease in the number of banks in the region ranging from 21% to 
32% depending on country. We will focus more specifically on the change in the 
number of banks in Brazil in section two.  This marked decrease in the number of banks 
in the market can be attributed more to the elimination of inefficient banks targeted by 
the government than to any market consolidation factors (Yildirim and Philippatos 
2007). 
Reform and consolidation has led to an inflow of foreign banks into the region and 
some credit their investment and long-term strategy outlook as a stabilizing force in the 
region’s banking sector (Haselmann 2006). Additionally, many governments feel that 
the pain felt by domestic banks in the liberalization period is outweighed by the benefits 
of having a more open and international banking sector. Feeling this to be true many 
governments in developing and developed nations have opened up their banking sectors 
to more foreign-owned banks (Claessens et al. 2001).  
 
3. The Real Plan and its Effects on the Makeup of the Brazilian Banking Sector 
This section focuses on the specific case of Brazil and its recent history in the banking 
sector. The recent past has been marked by reform, new regulations, foreign investment, 
privatization, and increases in efficiency among banks.  
The Real Plan was a major stabilization plan developed by the Brazilian government in 
order to reign in years of run away inflation and fiscal irresponsibility. The Real Plan 
used a semi-fixed exchange rate in conjunction with more open trade and investment 
policies. This led to a quasi-dollarization of the Brazilian Real. It was not a direct one to 
one dollarization as was in Argentina (Hallwood et al 2006). The Real Plan had some 
leeway in its exchange pattern as was seen after the Mexican crisis in 1994-1995 when 
the Brazilian government began to allow the Real to deflate little by little. This led to a 
full free float of the Real in 1999 after a period of intense speculative pressure on the 
currency (De Paula and Alves 2003).   
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The Real Plan had a striking and significant effect on inflation after its introduction in 
1994, and continued to help control inflation even after the deflation of the Brazilian 
Real in January of 1999 (De Paula and Alves 2003). For example, according to the 
Brazilian government the inflation rate in 1994 was 2240.17 and by 1998 it had fallen to 
4.85. In the year 2000 after the floating of the Brazilian Real inflation stayed at a 
respectable 8.03 even with the added pressure of the ending of the true semi-fixed 
exchange rate portion of the Real Plan in 1999.  
In terms of the Brazilian banking sector, before the Real Plan banks made a profit from 
inflation transfers. Inflation “charges” are felt by non-interest bearing deposits and cash 
deposits. Since the banks are the issuers of the deposits they receive a part of the 
inflation charges or inflation tax. This tax was a significant percentage of Brazilian 
banks’ profits. In the early 1990s inflation taxes for banks accounted for 3.4% of GDP 
(Nakane and Weintraub 2005). However after the instatement of the Real Plan and 
Brazil changing from a high inflation country to a low inflation country the inflation 
taxes as a percentage of GDP dropped to 0.03% in 1995 (De Paula and Alves 2003). If 
we take into account that the average yearly inflation rate was over 336% for the 1980’s 
in Brazil we can see that this has been a long standing income generator for Brazilian 
banks (Fraga 2004). However, this dramatic drop in profit locations for banks led them 
to more risky loan agreements with clients that may or may not have been credit worthy 
before. This led in turn to more loan defaults and more bank bailouts by the federal 
government.   
This period after the introduction of the Real plan is noted for additional measures taken 
by the Brazilian government in order to reign in some of the inefficient state banks 
within Brazil as well as inefficient and unsafe private banks. Beck et al. (2005) and 
Nakane and Weintraub (2005) take a specific look at the transformations in the 
Brazilian banking sector from before the Real Plan to after the deflation of the Brazilian 
Real, 1990-2002.  
Before the Real Plan state-owned banks in Brazil, that would be the banks owned by the 
individual states within the country, i.e. Sao Paulo, Espirito Santo, Parana, etc, had a 
long history of financial difficulties. These difficulties led to the federal government 
bailing them out on numerous occasions. This in itself led to more problems and the 
government decided it needed to do something with their financially troubled state 
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banks (Beck et al 2005). The proposal for dealing with the state banks need for reform 
came about in 1996 with the PROES program (Program of Incentives to the Reduction 
of the State-Level Public Sector in the Bank Activity).    
Within PROES a state bank had basically four choices. The first choice was liquidating 
the bank and go out of the market completely. Second, the bank could allow the federal 
government to take control and privatize or liquidate the bank. Third, the bank could 
privatize the bank themselves. Finally, the bank could be restructured and continue 
running as a state bank. There was another option which was turning the bank into a 
developmental agency (Beck et al 2005). Due to a long history of state governments 
using their state banks as patronage mechanisms it would seem that the state 
governments would prefer to restructure their banks and keep them under their control. 
However, in order to do that the state governments would have to cover at least half of 
the restructuring costs and institute full scale management change. These criteria set by 
the federal government were meant to force states’ hands in the matter and make them 
privatize their banks. With that purpose in mind they were successful seen in that as of 
2002 there were only 14 of the original 32 state banks remaining in operation from 
1994.  
The private sector banks were compelled into changing ownership structure and 
business style by the PROER program in 1995 (Program of Incentives to the 
Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System). Under PROER 
weak, inefficient, or threatened banks had the option to either increase their capital, 
transfer its shareholder control or be merged with another bank. In order to facilitate the 
transition and sales of the weaker private banks the central bank enacted measures to 
make it easier for stronger banks to purchase their weaker competitors (Nakane and 
Weintraub 2005). The PROER program saw a dramatic decrease in the number of 
private domestic banks within Brazil, from 146 private domestic banks in 1994 to only 
75 in 2002. This drop in real numbers of banks did not mean a drop in the share of the 
banking market by Brazilian domestic banks. In terms of share of deposits domestic 
private banks had a 38.85 share of the market in 1993 and a 37.16 share in 2002. 
Additionally, their share of the loan market increased from 31.55 in 1993 to 40.45. This 
increase is due in part to the extreme drop off in the share of the public sector banks, 
which fell from 61.88 of the loan market in 1993 to a mere 29.07 in 2002 (Nakane and 
Weintraub 2005)  
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In terms of foreign participation in the Brazilian market, the opening of the banking 
sector in correspondence with the Real Plan led to a large investment in international 
banks within Brazil. With the overall banking industry consolidated from 246 banks in 
1994 to 155 in 2002, the number of foreign controlled banks rose from 37 to 56 in the 
same time period. Additionally, the share of the market of foreign banks in terms of net 
worth, assets, deposits, and share of the loan market increased at an amazing rate. The 
share of the net worth of the Brazilian banking sector controlled by foreign banks rose 
from 7.32 in 1993 to 33.62 in 2002, while the share of assets rose from 8.36 to 27.67, 
deposits from 4.84 to 20.13, and share of the loan market increased from 6.57 to 30.48 
(Nakane and Weintraub 2005).  
When looking at the overall picture of the banking market within Brazil we can see a 
marked decrease in the participation of state and government banks while a 
corresponding increase in foreign participation and an increase in the amount of 
concentration within in the domestic banking sector. This leads one to believe that the 
more inefficient banks are slowly and surely being run out of the market while the 
quicker and more agile banks have snatched up the left over customers.  
 
4. The Influence of Foreign Banking Institutions on a Domestic Banking Industry 
The reforms and globalization of the financial sectors in Brazil, and indeed all of Latin 
America, lead to a marked increase in foreign bank participation during the 90s 
(Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). According to Nakane and Weintraub (2005) from 1994 
to 2002 Brazil saw an increase in the number of foreign owned banks of over 150% 
while the total number of banks in the country fell to 63% of their 1994 numbers. This 
contrast in the success of foreign banks versus the overall consolidation of the Brazilian 
banking market shows that the downfall of the state and federal banks in Brazil did not 
necessarily transfer to the foreign banks within Brazil.  
The Brazilian example is a common occurrence across Latin America and the 
consolidation of the domestic banking sectors did not have a negative effect on the 
foreign banks numbers. The foreign banks may not have been as negatively affected by 
the downturn as the domestic banks since they were geared toward more long-term 
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strategies and they ran with better cost efficiencies than the domestic inefficient banks 
that went out of business (Nakane and Weintraub 2005, Levine 1996).   
Some of the benefits enjoyed by the domestic banking client with the onset of foreign 
bank competition in the industry include an improved level of service, an increase in the 
number of financial products available to the domestic consumer and increased 
regulation that would allow for a more stable domestic banking environment (Levine 
1996). Levine (1996) also points out that the simple presence of internationally 
respected banks help countries to be able to gain access to international capital, because 
the international banks add credibility to the domestic banking market.  
Additionally, in terms of out of the pocket expenses the margins earned by the banks are 
reduced and this should be positive for the consumer (Claessens et al. 2001). These 
lower bank margins of the competitive banks would result in lower profits. Domestic 
banks are forced to become more cost efficient in order to stay competitive and 
profitable (Claessens et al. 2001).  
The main negative for the domestic banks would be the increased costs in competing 
against a larger international bank with a stronger reputation than the domestic bank. 
The domestic consumer may lose out as well as international banks may not be as 
willing to offer riskier loans for smaller domestic customers. (Claessens et al 2001, 
Beck et al 2005). Additionally, domestic governments would have less say in the flow 
of money in the economy since international banks may not be as willing to 
accommodate to domestic politics.  
Claessens et al’s study (2001) found some interesting results when comparing foreign 
banks in developed versus developing nations. While in developing nations 
foreign/international banks have higher profits than domestic banks the opposite is true 
in developed nations. This would show that the structures used by international banks in 
developing nations to be more efficient and productive than their domestic developing 
nations’ counterparts, while this did not hold true in developed nations. This may be due 
to a level of trust or entrenchment in the domestic developed banking sector that has 
already developed its own level of trust and reputation, thus cutting off one of the 
international banks’ main selling cards, i.e. stable reputation.  
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In the overall Brazilian market the banks were not the only entities being privatized or 
deregulated. According to statistics between 1988 and 1999 over half of all 
privatizations in the world were taking place in Latin America and in Brazil over the 
same time period privatizations surpassed 10% of the GDP in 1999 (Fraga 2004). These 
privatizations in areas such as banking, telecommunications and the energy sector can 
be seen as a harbourer of more foreign direct investment, thus leading to further inflows 
of capital and a more stable banking and capital markets.  
It is important to note why Brazil looks so attractive to foreign banks.  In Alon’s (2006) 
study on evaluating market size for service franchising in emerging markets it was 
noted that Brazil, Russia, and Mexico outranked China and India as the markets with 
the largest economies that would be accommodating to service franchising. With over 
80% of the world’s population living in emerging markets it is obvious to see why 
international banks are trying to make inroads into these countries. Alon notes that it is 
not only the population of a country that is important, but its GDP per capita, 
purchasing power parity, and urbanization. These factors taken together lead to a 
positive view of franchising within Brazil because it is highly urbanized (80%) and with 
a purchasing power parity that is twice that of China’s and three times that of India’s 
(Alon 2006).  
 
5. Competition and Consolidation and their Effects on Efficiency in the Banking 
Industry 
Competition in any industry is seen as a positive phenomenon, including the banking 
industries of Latin America. However, market concentration in developing nations is 
seem to have a negative effect on banking efficiency (Demirguc et al 2004). 
Additionally, many governments have been liberalizing their banking sectors in order to 
make them as competitive as possible and gain the benefits of perfect competition 
(Maudos and Guevara 2007). This is due to the theory that bank managers with market 
power have less incentive to deal with their inefficiencies and the cost of these 
inefficiencies are passed on to the bank customers.  
This would be in contrast to Demsetz’ (1973) theory that states that market 
concentration is not necessarily a bad thing. It also states that it does not have to lead to 
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the worst parts of monopolistic behaviour, such as false scarcity and higher consumer 
prices. The Demsetz’ (1973) work is interesting because it shows that this mindset of 
how a competitive firm builds its mini-monopoly by being the best firm out there rings 
true. In Brazil the banking industry is constantly innovating and trying to keep up with 
the competition and this constant innovation may be leading to a more concentrated 
market by forcing out weaker competition. This would then give the appearance of a 
monopoly or oligopoly. However, Demsetz’ (1973) and Panzer-Rosse (1987) model’s 
and theories could be used to evaluate the efficiency gains and 
competition/consolidation aspects of the Brazilian banking industry.  
We will develop more the Demsetz’ (1973) perception of industry structure and market 
rivalry. Demsetz looks at concentration of a market in terms of competitive pressures. 
These pressures are used by some firms to institute change and become more efficient 
and productive. They use this efficiency advantage to develop better more affordable 
products and with that advantage the firm gains more and more market share. This then 
forces out weaker competitors or takes away some market share of others. Demsetz 
states that an industry with a few firms can come about only from superior production 
or marketing skills or the market is only able to sustain a few competitors. This would 
then indicate that few firm industries do not necessarily mean there is a monopoly or 
oligopoly structure per se, as in terms of the negatives of monopolies or oligopoly 
collusion.  
According to Demsetz it may indeed be that the firm in control of the market or the few 
firms in control have superior competitive performance and thus they earn their market 
share by being the best in the market. This may take the shape of goodwill or a good 
reputation in the community or in the form of higher productivity in the specific 
knowledge that employees of the firms have (Demsetz 1973). Demsetz feels that profit 
may not come about in such “monopoly” like situations due to artificially created 
scarcity in the market, but by uncertainty, a bit of luck and efficient use of resources. 
This theory is termed the efficient structure hypothesis (Maudos and Guevara 2007). 
On the other hand, there are times when concentrated firms do act in collusion. 
However this will not be discussed here. We will be discussing how Demsetz points out 
how inefficiencies can come about by anti-concentration public policy. Demsetz brings 
up a concern that government intervention in consolidated markets may lead to more 
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inefficiencies than efficiencies, and thus the policy would be counterproductive. In his 
discussion he points out that firms that are better at serving a consumer base will tend to 
grow faster than other competing firms. They could then take advantage of scale 
economies and become mega companies controlling the whole market. However this is 
not seen as there are very few monopoly industries these days. Additionally in contrast 
to the monopoly/colluding oligopoly perspective of market concentration, the 
competitive view of swift alterations in market concentration levels, i.e. many 
companies moving in or out of the market, come about by the changing cost conditions 
as opposed to some sort of artificial barriers set up by the monopolists or oligopolists 
(Demsetz 1973). These base cost changes would vary across firms and thus would weed 
out the firms less likely to compete at these new competitive cost levels. Hence, the 
notion of the survival of the fittest.  
Some governments do see strong near monopoly companies or possible collusion as 
threats and develop policies to promote competition within the industry. In Demsetz 
research he came up with a model in order to test for a relationship between market 
concentration and relative rates of return that would shed light on whether an industry 
was indeed colluding. He felt that the monopolistic viewpoint would see that the 
difference between the rates of returns of large and small firms would not increase or 
decrease, as they would be working together to maintain the status quo. He did not find 
this. Moreover, he found that rapid changes in concentration in the market are brought 
about by changes in costs and not due to entry barriers set up as would be expected in 
collusion (Demsetz 1973).   
In terms of statistical testing of market concentration and competition the Panzer-Rosse 
H-Statistic (Panzer-Rosse 1987) has been used extensively. In their study Yildririm and 
Philippatos (2007) use a PR test in order to test for levels of competition and market 
concentration within Latin American countries’ banking sectors. Their findings show 
that no countries in Latin America have monopolies or perfect competition. They state 
that according to their research results the banks in these countries earn their profits and 
revenues as if they are in monopolistic competition. Therefore, they surmise that the 
highly concentrated banking markets in the region do not lead to anti-competitive 
conduct among the banks. Additionally, while following up on their original research 
they found that market concentration does not necessarily lead to a lower level of 
competition in the market or higher bank performances. Furthermore, domestic bank 
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performance was shown to be negatively affected by competition and foreign bank 
participation.  
In their H statistic studies Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) broke the time period 1993-
1999 into two groups (1993-1996 and 1997-1999) in order to study any variations in the 
concentration of the individual banking sectors over time. Their results for Brazil 
showed a decrease in competition over the two time periods from a PR H statistic of 
0.80 to 0.71. In the PR H statistic in this case the index is a bipolar model, where one 
equals perfect competition and zero represents a monopoly situation. This drop in the H 
Statistic would show that with the drop in the numbers of banks (Nakane and Weintraub 
2005) there has been a corresponding drop in competition, which would seem obvious. 
Additionally, the H-Statistic results throughout some Latin American countries varied 
from the 1993-1996 group to 1997-1999. For example, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela 
showed marked decreases in their H-Statistics which would represent a decrease in 
competition in the banking market, while Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
showed marked increases in their H-Statistics over the same period thus a increasing of 
competition (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). This helps to emphasize that though many 
of the Latin American countries’ banking sectors are going through changes and 
reforms the effects are different on a case by case basis and thus worth examining 
closer.      
On a more explanatory note, the Panzer-Rosse H Statistic is a general test for monopoly 
(Panzer, Rosse 1987). While investigating newspapers Rosse noticed something 
interesting. Newspapers tend to be local monopolies but the reduced form revenue 
equations kept showing coefficients that were not consistent to monopolies. Therefore, 
Panzer and Rosse (1987) came up with a few ideas of how to test for monopolies on 
their own. They used comparative statistics in order to test theories against each other. 
In terms of monopolistic competition versus monopoly they tested individual companies 
and then tested the market equilibrium in order to compare them to each other. The 
comparisons would show them the differences between the two. This is due to the 
theory that each firm would act as a monopoly regardless if they were in a monopoly or 
in monopolistic competition.   
Mkrtchyan (2005) used the Panzer-Rosse H statistic in his study of banking competition 
in emerging markets. He termed it that the PR test measures the competitive nature of a 
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market and the market power of the firms within said market. Moreover, the predictive 
movement of price changes to a cost change are different depending on if a firm has a 
monopoly. The H statistic is derived from a “reduced form revenue equation and 
measure of the sum of elasticities of total revenue of the bank with respect to bank input 
prices” (Mkrtchyan 2005, p. 69). As stated above, the H function is a function of 
demand elasticity where if the H stat equals to one we have perfect competition and if it 
is equal to zero there is a monopoly. All points in between zero and one represent 
monopolistic competition. Also, many other studies use the Panzer-Rosse H statistics in 
their studies on concentration and competition in the banking industry (Yetati and 
Micco 2003, Mkrtchyan 2005, Nakane and Weintraub 2005, Belaisch 2003, Claessens 
and Leaven 2004). This is why we feel it is important to discuss the Panzer-Rosse H 
statistic in order to compare to previous and other relevant studies. 
 
6.  Market Power and Efficiency  
The relationship between market power and efficiency can be explained in numerous 
ways, but the three main hypotheses discussed in Maudos and Guevara (2007) and other 
articles can be summarized as follows. 
 Structure-conduct-performance: This is the collusion hypothesis. Here the theory 
is that higher profits are brought about by collusion among the industry players. 
Therefore in this perspective the more concentrated a market becomes the easier 
it is to collude and gain extra profit from the collusion (Bain 1956). 
 Demsetz’ efficient structure hypothesis (see above): here the efficient banks and 
industries gain profits and market share due to their superior efficiencies. Thus 
the market consolidates as less efficient companies are forced out or lose market 
share to the efficiently superior companies (Demsetz 1973).  
 Relative market power hypothesis: The hypothesis states that market share and 
efficiency can be used to explain the variance in performance of a firm. 
Additionally, individual market share of a company is used as a proxy variable 
for assessing market power (Shepherd 1982). Quiet Life scenario which is 
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discussed in depth in section 5.1 is considered a part of the relative market 
power hypothesis. 
Taking into account the movements of concentration levels throughout Latin America 
as stated above using the Panzer-Rosse H-Statistic that showed decreasing, increasing 
and maintained levels of concentration (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007), it is of note that 
studies done during the same time noting the concentration changes had not affected the 
competitive practices within the region (Yeyati and Micco 2003). Additional studies on 
the level of competition in Brazil and other Latin American nations after the large scale 
concentrations of the markets showed that there was little or no decline in competition 
for the period of 1994-1999 (Gelos and Roldos 2004). Thus, these non-affected 
competitive practices even with the increased concentration would suggest a leaning 
toward the Demsetz’ efficient structure hypothesis.  
However, a further investigation into the worthiness of Panzer Rosse H-Statistic for 
testing for market concentration as a true representation for market power (Berger and 
Hannan 1998) would be important as it would then call for another measure to be used 
in order to gauge competition to have more robust results in terms of competition. This 
other measure or measures could then be used in addition to the Panzer Rosse H-
Statistic in order to test multiple theories and angles of the 
efficiency/competition/concentration triangle in the banking industry (Berger et al 2004, 
Claessens and Laeven 2004).  
An additional noteworthy point that has come up in a few articles on banking 
competition and concentration (Bos and Kolari 2005, Baleisch 2003) point out that in 
developing markets like Brazil that the large banks tend to work in more efficient and 
competitive ways, while smaller banks are seen to sometimes work in a more 
monopolistic way. One possible explanation as to why they may have their own small 
mini monopoly is due to the limited bank networks in less populated areas in some 
developing nations.    
In terms of measuring efficiency and as such competition we have other measures that 
need to be discussed. Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) has been used to measure 
inefficiencies and efficiencies in different industries. They were especially useful when 
dealing with group data, such as bank branches (Bos and Kolari 2005, Halkos and 
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Salamouris 2004, Camanho and Dyson 2006). DEA develops a set of indices that can be 
used to compare a wide range of factors within multiple groups. This would be used in 
order to compare different groups of banks within the Brazilian market, theoretically 
wealthier states’ banks (Sao Paulo versus poorer states’ banks, i.e. Alagoas), so as to 
help control for possible local monopolies in smaller markets.  
Frontier analysis is another noteworthy tool that can be used in order to determine 
efficiency gains. The frontier function approach bases efficiency frontiers of companies 
or industries at a maximum realistic output that a bank or financial institution can 
achieve with their current levels of input and technology (Shanmugam and Das 2004).  
Finally, other possible additions to the analysis of efficiency and competition that may 
better explain the effects and produce better interpretive thoughts of the results is a 
Lerner index of competition. Maudos and Guevara (2007) point out that (as stated 
above) that the Panzer Rosse and other concentration models may not be the best form 
of defining market competition and thus a different method should be used. They stated 
that the Lerner index could be used as the researcher would be able to have market 
power be represented at a bank level as opposed to an industry level, thus giving more 
defined results.  
 
7. The Quiet Life Scenario: Is it Applicable to all Situations? 
 “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” – Hicks (1935, p. 8) 
This quote from Hicks has been used constantly throughout economic literature to 
represent what some would say would be the worst part of monopoly action, and that 
would be inaction. The quiet life would symbolize when a company has more extreme 
market power, the lower the effort of managers and directors to eliminate inefficiencies. 
This may come about in the form of pricing above marginal costs, thus relaxing the 
need to reign in these inefficiencies. Therefore there would be a negative correlation 
between market power and efficiency (Maudos and Guevara 2007, Berger and Hannan 
1998).  
Berger and Hannan (1998) tested the quiet life hypothesis in concentrated and non-
concentrated banking sectors and their results came up with a few noteworthy 
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observations. As stated above with the marginal costs, managers may not have the same 
pressure to lower their costs and inefficiencies. Additionally, the concentrated market 
may allow managers to follow non-profit maximizing goals.  This could be in the form 
of pet projects or other non-core business activities. Also, in concentrated markets or 
non-competitive markets, managers may spend their time and energies at maintaining 
the market power of the company at the expense of controlling inefficiencies. Finally, 
and maybe the worst effect of the quiet life, inefficient and incompetent managers are 
not held accountable for their incompetence since their weak performance is hidden by 
the artificial margins. Thus they are allowed to stay in their positions continually 
hurting the company’s profitability.  
When taking Demsetz (1973) point of view it would seem that this is not always 
necessarily the case. According to Yildirim and Philippatos’ (2007) research, Brazil is 
termed in monopolistic competition. And over their two testing periods, 1992-1996 and 
1997-1999, Brazil seemed to move slightly more toward the monopoly side of the PR 
test, though still significantly more on the pure competition side (from 0.81 to 0.70). 
Monopolistic competition does have many of the hallmarks of monopolies, and many 
firms in monopolistic competition act in a monopolistic fashion (Panzer and Rosse 
1987). However, in terms of the development of efficiency in the Brazilian banking 
sector Beck et al (2005) and Nakane and Weintraub’s (2005) research both pointed to an 
increase in efficiency and productivity in the same time frame. This may largely be due 
to the elimination of many inefficient state, private, and federal banks in the Brazilian 
banking sector over the time period. However, these two almost contradictory findings 
lead us to believe there is more to be studied in this area in order to fully understand the 




The past twenty years have seen an astounding amount of reform and deregulation 
throughout the Latin American banking sector and especially Brazil. The period has 
been noted with crises, reforms, new currencies, foreign investment, and relatively 
stable financial systems. Brazil in particular has seen a complete overhaul of its banking 
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sector and has used its history of inflation and knowledge gained throughout the period 
to turn itself into an example of banking innovation in Latin America.  
The influence of foreign bank investment in the region has also played a large role in 
the reforms and development of the Latin American banking sector over the past two 
decades. The calming force that the international banks performed on the domestic 
market helped to stabilize soft markets and usher in reforms and a certain level of 
respectability for some regional banking sectors. They have also been instrumental in 
furthering innovation, product offerings, and cost efficiency improvements in the 
domestic banking sectors as well.  
Through various statistical methods, especially the Panzer-Rosse test, many studies 
have shown that the Latin American banking sector including Brazil can be represented 
as monopolistic competition. Though there are tendencies to see the sector as almost an 
oligarchy the data does not support this thinking (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007).  
Market power and efficiency relationships have been grouped into three main 
hypotheses. First is the structure-conduct-performance (SPC) or collusion hypothesis. 
Here greater profits are derived by collusion activities (Bain 1956). The second is the 
efficient structure hypothesis which states that efficient banks derive higher profits and 
higher market share as a reward for the more efficient use of resources (Demsetz 1973). 
The third is the relative market power hypothesis which hypothesis that the variance in 
a firm’s performance is due to its efficiency and by the residual influence of market 
share (Shepherd 1982).  
In a true monopolistic economy Hicks (1935) predicts a “Quiet Life” for the monopoly 
as its best and easiest course of action. This would mean that the monopoly sits back 
and enjoys its position while it lets innovation and new opportunities pass them by. This 
would not be the case in Brazil, where innovation and continued cost efficiency 
improvements have been developing in monopolistic competition. Demsetz’ (1973) 
efficient structure hypothesis may be what is at work in Brazil and needs further 




9. Future Research 
During the research for this article we took note that many of the bank studies whether 
done on banking in:  
 Australia: years 1995-2002 (Kirkwood and Nahm 2006),  
 Austria: years 1995-2002 (Hahn 2007),  
 Brazil (Beck et al 2005),  
 Czech Republic: years 1990-1999 (Matousek and Taci 2004),  
 European Union: years 1988-1999 (Espitia-Escuaer and Garcia-Cebrian 2004),  
 Greece: years 1997-1999 (Halkos and Salamouris 2004),  
 India: years 1992-1999 (Shanmugam and Das 2004),  
 Korea: years 1992-2002 (Park and Weber 2006),  
 Latin America: years 1970-2000 (Fraga 2004, Yeyati and Micco 2007),  
 Turkey: years 1990-2000 (El Gamal and Inanoglu 2005).  
All seemed to be done for periods leading up to 2002, but there afterwards there are few 
new tests run for the period from 2002 to the present 2008. Therefore, it would seem 
logical in this fast changing age where the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) are becoming more and more integral to the world economy that more up-to-date 
studies being made in order to test their market changes. This would include new 
Panzer-Rosse H-Statistical analysis in order to see how the Brazilian banking market 
has concentrated over the recent boom period, post 2002. Additionally, this would allow 
us to use other efficiency measures like the Lerner indices of market power, frontier 
analysis, data envelopment analysis, or other models in order to compare published 
historical figures from before 2002 (Beck 2005, Belaisch 2003) to the present day. This 
analysis would then allow us to track and theorize the developmental process of the 
Brazilian banking system over the recent past in terms of market concentration, 
efficiencies development, market competition levels, and other developments that may 
be noted along the research pathway.  
Having analyzed the recent past and determining successful and non-successful 
developments within the market, we hope to come up with recommendations for other 
banking sectors around the world in order for them to take advantage of the 
developments that have occurred in Brazil over the past decade. Whether they are 




Note to Reader 
This working paper is being shared in order to obtain ideas and critiques that will help to expand 
this paper into a more defined and relevant paper focusing on the Brazilian banking sector. We 
would appreciate any comments or critiques you find with this paper or the ideas presented here. 
Any advice will be greatly appreciated and the tougher the advice and comments the more we 
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